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Abstract
Land rental market development and off-farm employment have important implications for agricultural
production. This study examined the effects ofland rental market participation, the resulting land tenure
contracts, and off-farm employment on the technical efficiency in rice production in rural China, using
the one-step stochastic frontier approach. Data from a survey held at household and plot level in three
villages in north-east Jiangxi Province were used to estimate the stochastic frontier model. We found that
the mean technical efficiency of rice production in north-east Jiangxi Province ranged from 0.36 to 0.97,
with an average of 0.82. The determinants of technical efficiency show that households that rented land
achieved higher technical efficiency than households that did not rent land. Rice production on rented
plots was technically as efficient as on contracted plots. Additionally, participation in migration did not
have an effect on technical efficiency.
Additional keywords: migration, stochastic frontier approach, technical efficiency
Introduction
Economic reforms initiated in the late 1970S have drastically affected the development
of the Chinese agricultural sector. In particular, the switch from collective farming
to the household responsibility system (HRS) has resulted in an important change
in the land tenure system, where farmland is still owned by the village collective but
production and management of farmland are entrusted to individual households
through long-term contracts. The implementation of this new land tenure system
brought about a rapid growth of agricultural productivity in the early reform years
(1979-1984) because of the institutional innovation, which links farm households'
income closely with their own performance (McMillan et a!', 1989; Fan, 1991;
Lin, 1992). The rising agricultural productivity decreased the demand for labour
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in agriculture, providing a strong incentive for rural labourers to shift to off-farm
employment. Since the early 1980s an off-farm economy has emerged, consisting of
jobs in Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), in urban centres and more recently
private enterprises, and has accelerated its growth since 1995 (De Brauw et a!', 2002).
Farmland in China is legally owned by the village collective. Under the HRS,
land use rights have been equally assigned by the village collective to individual
farm households for a period of up to IS years, depending on family size, labour
force, or a combination ofboth. Land transfers were initially not allowed, because
policy makers believed that land transfers would lead to a concentration ofland in
the hands of a few households, leaving most households landless. Instead, frequent
administrative reallocations ofland by the village collective have been used to correct
for demographic changes. All of these have resulted in insecure land use rights, which
are often considered to reduce farm households' incentive to carry out long-term land
investment. To solve these problems, the Chinese government has permitted land
rentals since the mid-1980s and allowed land use rights to be extended for another 30
years in 1993. Since then a rural land rental market has emerged.
Theoretically, a land rental market can enhance allocative efficiency and
agricultural productivity by equalizing the marginal product ofland among households
with different land-labour endowments and by facilitating transfers ofland from less
productive households to more productive ones (Faruqee & Carey, 1997; Carter &
Olinto, 1998; Carter & Yao, 1999; 2002; Deininger & Feder, 2001; Deininger, 2003;
Deininger & Zegarra, 2003; Deininger et a!', 2003; Deininger & Jin, 2005; Yao, 2007).
However, in present-day China land rental arrangements are generally informal, short
term, and between households living in the same village. Plots rented from other
households are therefore subject to tenure insecurity, which may discourage long-term
land investment and reduce agricultural productivity.
The effect of off-farm employment on agricultural production is ambiguous. Off-
farm employment reduces the labour available for agricultural production, especially if
hiring agricultural labour incurs transaction costs and if hired labour is not as efficient
as family labour. Off-farm employment also enables households to increase their
incomes, to overcome credit and insurance constraints and to increase their use of
industrial inputs (Rozelle et a!', 1999a; Taylor et a!', 2003). In addition, the reduction
in food consumption resulting from household members working off-farm (e.g., those
who migrate) may have an impact on agricultural production decisions if household
production and consumption decisions are non-separable (Burger, 1994; Wouterse,
2006).
Most of the literature concerning land and labour market development and
agricultural production in rural China has focused either on the land (Lohmar et a!',
2001; Carter & Yao, 2002;) or on the labour market (Wu & Meng, 1997a, b; Rozelle et
a!', 1999a; Taylor et a!', 2003). Previous studies on the effect ofland tenure contracts
on agricultural production have focused on South Asia (Shaban, 1987; Otsuka &
Hayami, 1988; Binswanger et a!', 1995) and Africa (Gavian & Fafchamps, 1996; Gavian
& Ehui, 1999; Ahmed et a!', 2000; Place & Otsuka, 2000; Benin et a!', 2005; Pender
& Fafchamps, 2006). The focus of these studies has been on comparing the relative
efficiency of owner-operated, rented, or sharecropped plots. Many studies found an
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efficiency loss of sharecropped land relative to owner-operated land.
Empirical evidence shows that agricultural factor markets in rural China,
particularly land and labour, face many institutional obstacles and remain
underdeveloped (Carter & Yao, 2002; Bowlus & Sicular, 2003). Faced with land and
labour market imperfections, household production and consumption decisions
may be non-separable and household may make simultaneous decisions on land and
labour market participation and agricultural production. To our knowledge there has
been no research that has analysed the effect ofland and labour market participation
on agricultural production in rural China. The objective of this study was therefore
to estimate the technical efficiency in rice production and examine the effect of
land rental market participation, the resulting land tenure contracts, and off-farm
employment on technical efficiency in rural China.
This study used the stochastic frontier approach. It differs in several ways from
previous technical efficiency analyses in China (Tan, 2005; Chen et a!., 2006). First,
the input and output data were collected at plot level. This was expected to yield more
accurate technical efficiency scores, because plot characteristics (e.g., soil quality)
are different across plots. Second, only rice plots were included in the sample, as
production technologies and technical efficiency may differ across different crop
species. Third, a one-step stochastic frontier approach was applied to overcome the
misspecification of the efficiency levels (Kumbhakar et a!., 1991; Coelli et a!., 1998).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next chapter presents
the empirical stochastic frontier model and the data used in this study. Then the
estimation results are presented. The paper concludes with summarizing the main
findings and finally drawing some policy implications.
The stochastic frontier model
Theoretical model
A stochastic frontier production model (Aigner et a!., 1977; Battese & Corra, 1977;
Meeusen & Van De Broeck, 1977) is applied to estimate the technical efficiency scores
for different plots, as measurement errors and weather-related random disturbances
are substantial in analysing plot level data (Coelli, 1995). This means that we estimate a
production function with an error term consisting of two components, one to account
for pure random effects and another to account for technical inefficiency (TIE). This
production function can be expressed as follows:
(I)
where Yi is the output of plot i (i ~ I, ....... , n), Xi is a vector of inputs of the ith plot, f3 is
a row vector of an unknown parameter to be estimated, vi is the random error of plot i,
which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) as N(o, a~),
and independent of the Ui' a non-negative random error, which is assumed to account
for technical inefficiency (TIE) and often assumed to be iid and have a half normal
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N+(o, aa) distribution. It varies between 0 and I.
Technical efficiency is defined as TEi ~ exp(-uiJ. The technical efficiency
determinants are expressed as:
(Z)
366
where zi is a vector of factors that may determine the technical efficiency and does not
contain any variables in xi; 0 is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.
Parameters p, 0, av' aU' and TE are estimated by the maximum likelihood method.
Data
The data used in this paper were collected in three villages in north-east Jiangxi
Province described in Feng & Heerink (zo08). Farm household level data were
collected for the year zooo. Plot level data, however, were not collected then. Out of
the 3Z9 households interviewed in zooo and ZOOl, 5z households were randomly
selected. The analysis here is limited to households that rented land. This is because it
is impossible to ask households about their rice production on leased plots. Plot level
agricultural production data were collected in January Z003 for the entire year zooz. In
totalz15 rice plots were surveyed: 56 in Banqiao, 74 in Shangzhu and 85 in Gangyan
(Feng & Heerink, zo08). This is because rice is the dominant crop in the research area
Collected information includes tenure status of the plots, inputs and output of each
plot, plot characteristics, and soil quality.
Model specification and estimation methods
Specificationof the frontierproductionfunction
First, a frontier production function was specified. In frontier production analysis
generally two types of production functions are used: the Cobb-Douglas and the
translog function. The relatively large number of inputs that we distinguished in this
study greatly complicates the application of a translog function. For the analysis of the
data we therefore chose the Cobb-Douglas production function.
Agricultural production depends in general on land area, labour, seed, inorganic
fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, animal and mechanical traction, and soil quality.
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in our stochastic frontier production
function estimation, subdivided by land market regimes and tenure status of the plot,
are presented in Table I.
Households in the surveyed area grow either one or two rice crops a year. The yields
vary among varieties. For our study the yields have been aggregated and measured in
monetary units. The average rice output was 884.1Z yuan per plot, or z97.73 yuan per
mu and the average plot area per household used for rice production was about Z.9Z
mu (Table 1). Labour used for rice production was measured in man-days per plot.
Households work on average around 97.04 days on each plot, or 40 days on each mu of
land. Seed, inorganic fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides, and animal and mechanical
traction used for rice production were measured in monetary units. All inputs in
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics ofthe variables used in the stochastic frontier production function estimation, in
relation to land rental market regime and tenure status ofthe plots.
Item Unitl Type ofhousehold
dummy
values Renting Selfsufficient All plots
Contracted Rented Contracted
(n~60) (n~43) (n ~ II2) (n ~ 215)
-------------- [Mean (standard deviation)] - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Dependent variable
Gross value of rice output yuan I 948.03 (719.56 ) 1341.28 (1930.26) 674.36 (739.02) 884.12 (II06.09)
Explanatory variables
Area planted mu" 2.97 (2.20) 3.88 (5·°3) 2.53 (2.41) 2.92 (po)
Labour used days 97.5 8 (69·97) II5.35 (ro8·9 O ) 89·73 (5 8.53) 97.04 (74·49)
Seed yuan 25.26 (25·57) 28·77 (43·ro) 26.16 (23.13) 26.43 (28.70 )
Inorganic fertilizers yuan 163.95 (157-70 ) 213.89 (271.79) II2.14 (143.74) 146 ,95 (183.54)
Herbicides &pesticides yuan 31.80 (27.08) 44.25 (71.37) 26.06 (24.62) 31.30 (39·55)
Oxen &tractors used yuan 73-16 (57.87) 92.35 (II3-}6) 69·47 (97.67) 75.08 (92.°4)
Topsoil depth cm 16·73 (4·54) 17.80 (3.86) 16.36 (3·74) 16.75 (4.02)
Banqiao dummy ° orr 0.22 (0.42) 0.12 (0.32) 0.34 (0.48) 0.26 (0.44)
Shangzhu dummy ° orr 0.15 (0.36) 0.07 (0.26) 0.55 (0.5 0) 0.34 (0.48)
I Based on price level of 2002. Since the autumn of 2003 prices have risen considerably.
" I mu ~ 1/15 ha.
the Cobb-Douglas production function were expected to have a positive effect on rice
production, except for herbicides and pesticides. Their effects on land productivity depend
on whether they are applied for the prevention or control ofweeds and pests.
In addition to the traditional inputs, rice production is influenced by the quality of
the soil. In this study, topsoil depth was used as soil quality indicator. Topsoil depth
was estimated by soil scientists, and measured in centimetres. It was expected that rice
production is positively correlated with topsoil depth. Two dummy variables for the
Banqiao and Shangzhu villages were included to capture the variation in other factors
that systematically differ between the villages. It was assumed that the production
frontier may shift by village.
Specificationof the technicalefficiencyfunction
Technical efficiency is likely to be affected by factors that are associated with farm
management practices (Forsund et a!., 1980), including indicators of plot tenure
security, plot characteristics, farm characteristics, household characteristics, household
participation in the land rental market and off-farm employment. Descriptive statistics
of the variables used in technical efficiency determinant estimation, subdivided by land
market regimes and tenure status of the plot are listed in Table 2.
Plot tenure security is represented by the tenure status of the plot. Two plot tenure
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the technical efficiency determinant estimation, in rela-
tion to land market regime and tenure status ofthe plots.
Item Unitl Type ofhousehold
dummy
values Renting Self-sufficient All plots
Contracted Rented Contracted
(n~60) (n~43) (n ~ II2) (n ~ 215)
-------------- [Mean (standard deviation)]! ----------------
Dependent variable
Technical efficiency 0.87 (0.10) 0.89 (0.10) 0.77 (0.15) 0.82 (0.14)
Explanatory variables
Rented plot (A) o orr 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.20 (0,40)
Household renting land (B) 2 0.72 (0.26) 0.77 (0.24) 0.14 (0.20) 0.43 (0.38)
A x B interaction 0.00 (0.00) 0.7] (0.24) 0.00 (0.00) 0.15 (0.33)
Participate in migration o orr 0.53 (0,50 ) 0.40 (0·49) 0.54 (0,50 ) 0.51 (0,50)
Distance from home minutes 1V76 (8.22) 17.92 (13.63) 11.23 (10.29) 12.71 (10.81)
Household size persons 5.60 (1.44) 5.40 (1.43) 4·79 (1.91) 5.13 (1.73)
No. ofdependants persons 1.98 (I.32) 2.26 (1.42) 1.39 (1.02) 1.73 (1.24)
No. ofdurable assets 7.08 (1.41) 7.30 (I.32) 6.46 (1. 67) 6.80 (1.57)
Total number ofcattle I.I7 (1.76 ) 2.16 (3-22) 0.67 (0.47) I.II (1.82)
Age household head years 5I.I5 (I3· II ) 46 .84 (13-29) 45.46 (9.81) 47·33 (11.75)
Education household head years 3.78 (2·49) 4.37 (2.61) 5.24 (2.86) 4.66 (2.78)
Female-male adult ratio I.I2 (0.67) I.I4 (0·57) 1.09 (0.69) I.II (0.66)
No. ofplots 4·33 (1.74) 4.30 (1.3 2) 4.98 (1.96 ) 4.67 (1.81)
Irrigated land per adult mu3 2.39 (1. 65) 3-25 (2.10) 2.06 (1.38) 2.39 (1.68)
! Means in the same row, printed in bold are statistically different (P < 0.005).
2 Household renting decisions are possibilities predicted with a probit model (see Appendix 2).
3 I mu ~ IllS ha.
statuses were distinguished: contracted and rented. Contracted plots are plots that are
distributed directly by the village collective. Rented plots are plots rented from other
households. Of all the plots in the analysis, 172 plots were contracted, and 43 plots
rented. A dummy variable, which equals I when the plot was rented and 0 when the
plot was contracted, was used to indicate the tenure status of the plot. Normally, the
land rental arrangements are verbal and of short duration. Rented plots are therefore
less secure than contracted plots and expected to be negatively correlated with technical
efficiency. Plot characteristics are represented by the distance between plot and home.
This distance is measured in minutes travelling time. A longer travelling time raises
the cost of carrying inputs from home. On distant plots, farm households tend to apply
inputs in larger quantities and at lower frequencies. Distance is thus expected to be
negatively correlated with technical efficiency.
Farm characteristics were represented by the number of cattle in a household at the
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end of the previous year, age and education of the head of the household, the household
land endowment, and the number of plots that a household had. In the research area,
cattle are very important draft animals for small-scale households. The number of
cattle in a household is expected to have a positive impact on technical efficiency, as
the availability of cattle is associated with the timeliness ofland preparation in rice
production. Age of the household head was used as a proxy for the family's farming
experience. The effect of age on technical efficiency is ambiguous, depending on
whether older farmers are more experienced or more likely to stick to farming
traditions and less likely to adopt new technologies. Education of the household head
was used as a proxy for the management skills of a family. Technical efficiency is
expected to increase with education as education increases the household's ability to
utilize existing technologies and make farm management decisions (Battese & Coelli,
1995). The household land endowment was represented by the area of irrigated land
contracted per adult. The household land endowment is expected to have a positive
impact on technical efficiency, because a larger land endowment implies the economy
of scale. The square of this variable was added to the equation to capture the possible
non-linearities in its impact. The number of plots in a household is an indicator ofland
fragmentation, which can have either negative or positive effects on technical efficiency
(Tan, 2005). On the one hand, a larger number of plots needs more labour (Nguyen
et a!., 1996) and may be more difficult to manage. On the other hand, it enables
households to optimize their labour allocation over different crop species and seasons,
especially if there is no market for agricultural labour (Fenoaltea, 1976).
Household characteristics were represented by the number of durable assets in
a household, household size, number of dependants in a household, and the ratio
female-male adults. Households with more durable assets are expected to face fewer
obstacles in agricultural production, as they have more resources available for paying
fixed costs and for obtaining the information needed to adopt new technologies. So the
number of durable assets in a household is expected to improve technical efficiency.
Household size, number of dependants in a household and the ratio female-male
adults are expected to affect technical efficiency through their effects on the household
time endowment. Larger households and those with fewer dependants are expected to
be technically more efficient since they have more labourers available to implement
farm management practices in time. The ratio female-male adults is used to test for
differences between females and males in physical strength or other differences in
agricultural production. Males are more likely to deal with farming operations that
require much physical strength. It is therefore expected that a higher value of this ratio
will lead to a low technical efficiency.
As mentioned previously, households renting land are expected to achieve a higher
technical efficiency because a developed land rental market enables the transfer of
land from less efficient, to more efficient households. Following Pender & Fafchamps
(2006), the interaction between households renting land and the rented plot dummy
was included in the model to test for differences in technical efficiency on contracted
and rented plots for households that rent land. This is because it is not possible to
determine these differences from the average effect of either the tenure status of the
plot or households renting land. Off-farm employment affects technical efficiency
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in three ways. The first one is through the lost-labour effect. Off-farm employment
can be expected to reduce technical efficiency, especially if hiring agricultural labour
incurs transaction costs and hired labour is not as efficient as family labour. The
second one is through the income effect. Off-farm employment is expected to increase
household incomes, and thereby facilitate the use of material inputs and improve
technical efficiency (Rozelle et a!., 1999a; Taylor et a!., 2003). The third one is through
the reduced-consumption effect. Household members working off-farm (e.g., off-
farm employment by migrated members) means less food consumption and therefore
reduces agricultural production if household production and consumption decisions are
non-separable (Burger, 1994; Wouterse, 2006). So the effect of off-farm employment
on technical efficiency is ambiguous.
Estimation method
The stochastic frontier model can be estimated using one-step or two-step approaches.
In the two-step procedure, the frontier production function and the firm's efficiency
levels (TE) are estimated first (Equation I), ignoring a set of variables (z) that affect
technical efficiency. In the second step, efficiency levels (TE) are regressed against
the variables (z) to see how efficiency levels vary with these variables (Equation 2).
However, the two-stage procedure has long been recognized to yield biased results
because the model estimated at the first step is misspecified (Coelli et a!., 1998; Wang
& Schmidt, 2002). A one-step procedure is suggested to solve the bias problem, in
which the relationship between technical efficiency and the variables is imposed
directly in estimating the frontier production function and the firm's efficiency levels
(Kumbhakar et a!., 1991; Wang & Schmidt, 2002). The maximum likelihood estimates
were computed using the statistical package STATA 9.
All explanatory variables in Equation 2 should be exogenous. However, households'
participation in land renting as well as off-farm employment may be endogenous as
they depend on household characteristics, farm characteristics, household land and
labour endowments, institutional factors, and market rent, wage, and other prices
[see Feng & Heerink (2008) for details]. As mentioned earlier, data on household
participation in off-farm employment were collected for the year 2000, whereas data
on household participation in land renting and plot level agricultural production
were collected for the year 2002. Household participation in off-farm employment
is therefore treated as exogenous, and represented by households' participation in
migration in the year 2000. Decisions on land renting were made in the year 2002 and
may therefore be considered endogenous. Inclusion of endogenous variables in the
estimation may result in biased estimates. Instrumental variables are used to address
this endogeneity problem. First a probit model was used to estimate land renting at
the farm household level, and to predict the probability of households' participation in
land renting. The predicted probability was then used as an instrument for the actual
participation in the land rental market in maximum likelihood estimates.
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Estimation results
Determinants of renting land
The dependent variable for renting land is a binary variable, which equals I if the
household rented land in year zooz, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables
and their expected effects were specified and discussed in detail in Feng & Heerink
(zo08). The statistics of the explanatory variables, grouped by households' land market
participation decisions, are summarized in Appendix 1.
Of all the households in the three villages, 19 households rented irrigated land
in zooz. The results of the probit model are presented in Appendix z. A U-shaped
relationship was found between land availability and land renting decisions. This
finding confirms the result for the initial3z9 households analysed by Feng (zo06),
i.e., that households with both low and high land availability are more likely to rent
additional land. A possible explanation is that households with relatively large land
availability tend to specialize in agricultural production and therefore want to enlarge
their farm size. The turning point was z.35 mu.
The land transfer rights indicator positively affected land-renting decisions. This
confirms the hypothesis that households that enjoy more land transfer rights tend to
rent additional land. Households' migration experience did not affect land renting.
The results for the two village dummy variables indicate that there were significant
differences between the villages in market wage, land rent and other factors affecting
renting land. Households in Banqiao and Shangzhu villages were less likely to rent
additional land than households in Gangyan village.
The stochastic frontier production function and technical efficiency scores
The results of the stochastic frontier production function are presented in the upper
part ofTable 3. As expected, output responded positively to land, labour and inorganic
fertilizers. The elasticities of output with respect to land, labour and inorganic fertilizers
were 0.93, 0.06 and 0.06, respectively, indicating the importance ofland as a scarce
resource for rice production in China. Surprisingly, output responses to seed and
oxen and tractor were negative and statistically significant. The sum of the elasticities,
excluding soil quality and the two village dummies, was 0.94. A test for constant returns
to scale is rejected for rice production. The quality of the plot, represented by topsoil
depth, is an important determinant of rice production. The elasticity with respect to
topsoil depth was 0.18, suggesting the importance of improving soil quality for rice
production. The results for the two village dummy variables indicate that plots in Banqiao
and Shangzhu village achieve a lower rice output than the plots in Gangyan village.
Technical efficiency scores obtained from the stochastic frontier production
function are summarized in Table z. The average technical efficiency score for our
sample was 0.8z, which is consistent with an earlier study conducted in the same
villages (Tan, zooS). This indicates that on average 8z% of the potential output can be
obtained by using the current mixture of production inputs. It also reveals the challenge
and potential for improving rice production in north-east Jiangxi Province. The technical
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Table 3. Frontier production functions and technical efficiency estimates.
Independent variable Coefficient I z-score
Stochastic frontier function
In area planted (mu) "
In labour used (days)
In seed used (yuan)
In inorganic fertilizer used (yuan)
In herbicides and pesticides used (yuan)
In oxen and tractor used (yuan)
In topsoil depth (cm)
Banqiao dummy
Shangzhu dummy
Intercept
0,92***
0.08**
-0.05***
0.06*
0.001
-0.07***
0.18***
-O.II***
-0.17**
5.27***
17·57
2.25
-2.98
1.70
0.05
-3· ro
2·79
-2.71
-2.40
19.01
Factors determining technical efficiency
Type oftenure
Rented plot 3 (A)
Land rental market participation and offfarm employment
Household renting land 3 (B)
Interaction A x B
Participate in migration (I ~ yes)
Other variables
In distance from home (minutes)
In household size (persons)
In number ofdependants (persons)
In number ofdurable assets
In total number ofcattle
In age ofhousehold head (years)
In education ofhousehold head (years)
In ratio female / male adults
In number ofplots
In irrigated land per adult (mu)
In (irrigated land per adult) squared
Intercept
a y
Number ofobservations
log likelihood
Waldx" (8)
P>X" 0.00
-0.48 -0·39
1.78** 2.10
0.07 0.04
-0.38 -0.89
0.21 I.II
2.15** 2.09
-1.49** -2.30
O.ro 0.21
-0.88 -1.59
-0.70 -0.65
-0.20 -0.71
-0·99** -1.65
-2.II*** -3-49
1.23** 2.22
0.78 1.29
5.65 1.19
0.14*** 7.50
372
I Level of statistical significance. *: P ~ O.ro: **: P ~ 0.05: ***: P ~ 0.01.
"Imu~ 1/15ha.
3 Renting decision is predicted probability estimated by a probit model (see Appendix 2). A test for multicoli-
nearity ofvariables included showed that the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was 4.72. For area planted,
type of tenure and the interaction term, VIF was 12.14, 11.01 and 12.18, respectively. However, this multicoli-
nearity is inevitable since these variables must be included in the analysis. An attempt was made to normalize
plot output and inputs by plot area in order to solve the multicolinearity detected, but the results were not
importantly different.
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efficiency estimates ranged from 0.36 to 0.97. Of all the plots in our sample, around
35% had technical efficiency scores below 0.8z. This suggests that substantial gains in
rice production can still be obtained by improving farm management practices under
the existing technologies.
Determinants of technical efficiency
The results for the determinants of technical efficiency are presented in the lower part
ofTable 3. The technical efficiency did not differ significantly between rented plots and
contracted plots, indicating that rented plots are technically as efficient as contracted
plots. A possible explanation is that land investments are less on rented plots due to
insecure tenure, but that more variable inputs are used because households renting
land tend to maximize short-term agricultural profits on these plots. Households
renting land achieved a higher technical efficiency. This finding confirms the result
of earlier research by Lohmar et a!. (ZOOl) and Feng (zo06), i.e., that land rental
markets could facilitate the transfer ofland from less productive households to more
productive households. For households that rent land, no difference was found in
technical efficiency between rented plots and contracted plots. This is shown by
the insignificance of the sum of the coefficients for rented plots and the interaction
between household renting land and rented plot (0.41; P ~ 0.63). This finding indicates
that there is no efficiency loss on rented plots relative to contracted plots (Shaban,
1987; Pender & Fafchamps, zo06). Participation in migration did not have an effect on
technical efficiency.
Household size positively affected technical efficiency, whereas the number of
dependants had a negative effect, indicating that larger households and households
with fewer dependants were technically more efficient. An explanation for this may
be that these households consume more food and therefore strive for a higher output.
In addition, these households have more labour endowment available for timely farm
management practices. As expected, the ratio female-male adults had a negative effect
on technical efficiency. Surprisingly, land availability positively affected technical
efficiency, indicating either an increasing returns to scale or imperfections in factor
markets. The number of plots in a household negatively affected technical efficiency,
which indicates that land fragmentation reduces technical efficiency.
Conclusions
Land rental market development and off-farm employment have important implications
for agricultural production. Applying household and plot level data, this study
investigated the technical efficiency in rice production and examined the effect of
land rental market participation, the resulting land tenure contracts, and off-farm
employment on technical efficiency in three villages in north-east Jiangxi Province. A
one-step stochastic frontier approach was applied to overcome the misspecification of
the efficiency levels (Kumbhakar et a!', 1991; Coelli et a!', 1998).
We found that the mean technical efficiency of rice production in north-east Jiangxi
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Province was 0.82, suggesting that there is an r8% scope for increasing rice production
under the existing technological conditions. The technical efficiency estimates ranged
from 0.36 to 0.97. Results from the determinants of technical efficiency show that
rented plots are technically as efficient as contracted plots. This finding confirms that
there is no efficiency loss on rented plots relative to contracted plots. Households
renting land achieve a higher technical efficiency, indicating that the development
ofland rental markets allows land to be transferred to those that are more capable
of earning a high return from agricultural production. The results therefore suggest
that policies to stimulate the development ofland rental markets could contribute
significantly to agricultural production in rural China.
The findings also show that participation in migration does not have an effect
on technical efficiency. A possible explanation of this finding is that agricultural
production in the research area is characterized by a small farm size and a large labour
surplus and that the remittances sent by migrants are mainly used for non-agricultural
purposes, such as building houses and marriage. Although off-farm employment does
not directly affect agricultural production, policies aimed at improving access to off-
farm employment opportunities may at least improve labour productivity in agricultural
production and household incomes in rural China.
Our analysis was affected by a number oflimitations. First, to facilitate the use of
the one-step stochastic frontier approach some strong assumptions had to be made
about the standard errors, such as homoskedasticity, and independence of different
plots managed by the same household. The statistical issues of testing the validity of
these strong assumptions need to be addressed in future research. Second, the analysis
focused on the plot and not on the household. By focusing on plots, this study ignored
implicitly the heterogeneity between different households. However, this is inevitable
in this kind of analysis (Ahmed et a!., 2002).
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Appendix 1
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in land rental market participation
Item Unitl Type ofhousehold
dummy
values Self-sufficient Renting land All households
in land
(n ~ 33) (n ~ 19) (n ~ 52)
Household size persons 4.70 (1.86) I 5·47 (r.so ) 4.98 (1.77)
No. of dependants persons 1.33 (0·99) 1.79 (1.3 2) 1.50 (1.13)
No. of durable assets 6.52 (1.82) 7·II (1.41) 6·73 (1.69)
Total number of cattle 0.67 (0.48) 1.32 (2.19) 0.90 (1.39)
Age ofhousehold head years 45-39 (9.81) 2 51.84 (12.62) 47.75 (11. 24)
Education ofhousehold head years 5.2.7 (2.83) 3.84 (2.5 0 ) 4.75 (2.78)
Female-male adult ratio I.I3 (0·74) 1.23 (0·79) I.I7 (0·75)
Irrigated land per adult mu3 1.88 (1.26) 2.24 (1.76) 2.01 (1.46)
Possession land contract o or I 0.15 (0.36) 0.21 (0.42) 0.17 (0.38)
Land transfer rights 0.56 (0.13) 0.64 (0.13) 0.59 (0.13)
Participate in migration o or I 0.52 (0.51) 0.53 (0.51) 0.52 (0.5 0 )
Banqiao dummy o or I 0.33 (0.48) 0.21 (0.42) 0.29 (0.46)
Shangzhu dummy o or I 0.55 (0.51) 0.16 (0.38) 0.40 (0.5 0 )
I Means with standard deviation in parentheses.
2 Means in the same row, printed in bold are statistically different (P < o.ro).
3 I mu~ 1/15 ha.
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Appendix 2
Determinants of land renting probit model
Independent variable
In household size (persons)
In number of dependants (persons)
In number of durable assets
In total number of cattle
In age of household head (years)
In (age of household head)"
In education of household head (years)
In ratio of female / male adults
In irrigated land per adult (mu)
In (irrigated land per adult)"
Possession land contract (1 ~ yes)
Land transfer rights
Participate in migration (1 ~ yes)
Banqiao dummy
Shangzhu dummy
Intercept
Number of observations
log likelihood
Pseudo R"
Correctly specified (%)
Estimated coefficient I
(z-score)
1.46 (0.81)
-0·39 (-0·35)
0.45 (0.66)
1.34 (1.53)
-15.61 (-0·35)
2.35 (0,41)
0.20 (0.35)
-0.24 (-0.24)
-1.41 (-2.81)***
0.83 (2.II)**
0.64 (I.II)
3.39 (1.82)*
-0.67 (-I.ro)
-1.92 (-2.22)**
-2·79 (-3.5 2)***
20.88 (0.25)
52
-16.85
0.51
88.46
378
I Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Statistical significance: * ~ P < O.ro: ** ~ P < 0.05:
*** ~ P < 0.01. Test for multicolinearity among variables shows that mean variance inflation factor
(VIF) is 2.07, and VIF for each individual variable is lower than ro.
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